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Why is “worthless” fiat money generally accepted as payment for goods and services? In equi-
librium theory, the value of money is generally not determined: the number of equations is one less
than the number of unknowns, so only relative prices are determined. In the language of mathemat-
ics, the equations are “homogeneous of order one”. Using the language of physics, this represents
a continuous “Goldstone” symmetry. However, the continuous symmetry is often broken by the
dynamics of the system, thus fixing the value of the otherwise undetermined variable. In economics,
the value of money is a strategic variable which each agent must determine at each transaction by
estimating the effect of future interactions with other agents. This idea is illustrated by a simple
network model of monopolistic vendors and buyers, with bounded rationality. We submit that dy-
namical, spontaneous symmetry breaking is the fundamental principle for fixing the value of money.
Perhaps the continuous symmetry representing the lack of restoring force is also the fundamental
reason for large fluctuations in stock markets.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le 05.40.Ca 05.70.Ln 89.90.+n
I. INTRODUCTION
In classical equilibrium theory in economics [1], agents submit their demand-versus-price functions to a “central
agent” who then determines the relative prices of goods and their allocation to individual agents. The absolute prices
are not fixed, so the process does not determine the value of money, which merely enters as a fictitious quantity
that facilitates the calculation of equilibrium. Thus, traditional equilibrium theory does not offer a fundamental
explanation of money, perhaps the most essential quantity in a modern economy.
Money is essentially a dynamical phenomenon, since its role is intimately related to the temporal sequence of events.
Suppose an agent has apples and wants oranges. He might have to sell his apples to another agent before he buys
oranges from a third agent: hence money is needed for the transaction, supplying liquidity. It stores value between
transactions. If everybody could get together at a common market-place, there would be no need for money.
A “search-theoretic” approach to monetary economics has recently been proposed, [2,3], in which agents may be
either money traders, producers, or commodity traders. The agents randomly interact with each other, and they
decide whether or not to trade based on “rational expectations” about the value of a transaction. After a transaction
the agent changes into one of the two other types of agents. This theory has a steady state where money circulates.
As in other equilibrium theories, this theory does not describe a dynamics leading to the steady state, of sufficient
detail, say for one to simulate it if one would so desire. The value of money comes about by: (1) pre-defining the ratio
of agents which are money traders; and (2) requiring each money-trader to spend all his money at each transaction.
Actually, Trejos and Wright [3] found their monetary equilibrium to be unstable with respect to a small perturbation
of the expected value of money, causing the system to slide to a stable fixed point where money has no value!
Within our picture [4] there is no restoring force for the value of money—which could in principle be anything, with
no consequences for the actual physical transactions that takes place. The value of money represents a “continuous
symmetry”. If, at some point, the value of money was globally redefined by a certain factor, this would have no
consequences whatsoever. Thus, in order to arrive at a specific value of money, the continuous symmetry must be
broken.
The principle of continuous symmetries, and, particularly, the spontaneous breaking of those symmetries, is hugely
important in physics. Indeed, it is the basic principle behind our understanding of the properties of fundamental
particles. It is also responsible for magnetic order and superconductivity. As an example, consider, for instance, a
lattice of interacting atoms forming a crystal. The crystal’s physical properties, including its energy, are not affected
by a uniform translation X of all atoms. The position of the crystal represents a continuous symmetry. It could in
principle be anywhere. Nevertheless, starting with an arbitrary position of the individual atoms, the dynamics of
the atoms interacting with their neighbors fix the actual position of the entire crystal! We say that the continuous
symmetry is “dynamically broken”. Note that if we shift the crystal there is no restoring force. Also, if the system
is subjected to random noise, the lack of restoring force, expressed by the underlying continuous symmetry, leads to
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large positional fluctuations. The atoms exhibit “bounded rationality”: they simply adjust to the positions of their
neighbors, wherever they might me. In order to calculate their dynamics one does not need any information of the
ultimate equilibrium (if one exists) of the entire system.
In economics, the agents represent the atoms of the economy. The value that an agent assigns to money corresponds
to the position of an atom. The neighbors represent the subsystem of agents with which an individual agent interact,
in one way or another. The local actions of the agents determine the value of money for each agent at each instant
of time. The average value of money, corresponding to the “center of mass” for the atomic chain, is fixed by the
collective dynamics of all the agents.
Figure 1 illustrates the concept of continuous symmetries in the two cases. The physical properties of the chain of
atoms are invariant under a uniform shift of all atoms. The economy is invariant under a uniform shift of all prices.
The actual positions, including the “center of mass” in both cases are fixed by the dynamics.
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FIG. 1. Continuous symmetries for chain of atom (top) and prices (bottom). The properties of both systems are invariant
under a uniform shift as indicated by the arrow.
It is hard to envision a picture of an economy which does not derive its properties starting from a reasonably
realistic and “simulatable” model of the behavior of the individual agents. In the final analysis, even equilibrium
theory must have a dynamical underpinning if, in any sense, it aims at modeling a dynamical world.
It is not so important for our considerations how the agents actually behave, i.e., to what extent their behavior
might be considered rational, as long as they somehow adjust their behavior in response to their local environment.
To be specific, we study a network of vendors and buyers, each of whom have a simple local optimization strategy.
Whenever a transaction is considered, the agent must decide the value of the goods and services in question, or,
equivalently, the value of money relatively to that of the goods and services he intends to buy or sell. He will associate
that value to his money that he believes will maximize his utility. Thus, the value of money is a “strategic variable,”
that the agent in principle is free to choose as he pleases. However, if he makes a poor choice he will loose utility. In
any case, the dynamics of his action, together with those of other agents, will break the continuous symmetry.
For simplicity, we assume that agents are rather myopic: they have short memories, and they take into account
only the properties of their “neighbors,” i.e., the agents with which they interact directly. They have no idea about
what happens elsewhere in the economy.
Despite the bounded rationality of these agents, the economy self-organizes into an equilibrium state. Since we
define the dynamics explicitly, we are, however, able to treat the nature of this relaxation to the equilibrium state,
as well as the response of the system to perturbations, and to noise-induced fluctuations around the equilibrium.
These phenomena are intimately related to the dynamics of the system, and cannot be discussed within any theory
concerned only with the equilibrium situation. The value of money is fixed by a “bootstrap” process: agents benefit
from assigning a specific value to money, despite this value’s global indeterminacy.
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II. THE MODEL
In our model, we consider N agents, n = 1, 2, . . . , N , placed on a one-dimensional lattice with periodic boundary
conditions. This geometry is chosen in order to have a simple and specific way of defining who is interacting with
whom. The geometry is not important for our general conclusions concerning the principles behind the fixation of
prices.
We assume that agents cannot consume their own output, so in order to consume they have to trade, and in order
to trade they need to produce. Each agent produces a quantity qn, of one good, which is sold at a unit price pn, to
his left neighbor n− 1. He next buys and consumes one good from his neighbor to the right, who then buys the good
of his right neighbor, etc., until all agents have made two transactions. This process is repeated indefinitely, say, once
per day.
Our model is a simple extension of Jevons’ [7] example of a three agent, three commodity economy with the failure
of the double coincidence of wants, i.e., when only one member of a trading pair wants a good owned by the other. A
way out of the paradox of no trade where there is gain to be obtained by all is to utilize a money desired by and held
by all. Originally this was gold, but here we show that the system dynamics can attach value to “worthless” paper
money.
For simplicity, all agents are given utility functions of the same form
un = −c(qn) + d(qn+1) + In ·(pnqn − pn+1qn+1) . (1)
The first term −c, represents the agent’s cost, or displeasure, associated with producing qn units of the good he
produces. The displeasure is an increasing function of q, and c is convex, say because the agent gets tired. The second
term d, is his utility of the good he can obtain from his neighbor. Its marginal utility is decreasing with q, so d is
concave.
An explicit example is chosen for illustration and analysis,
c(qn) = aq
α
n , d(qn+1) = bq
β
n+1 , (2)
where a is 12 and of dimension [utility per (unit of qn)
α], b is 2 and of dimension [utility per (unit of qn+1)
β ], and α
and β are chosen as 2 and 12 . The specific values of a, b, α, and β are not important for the general results, as long
as c remains convex and d concave.
The last term represents the change in utility associated with the gain or loss of money after the two trades. Notice
that the dimension of In is [utility per unit of currency], i.e., the physical interpretation is the value of money.
Each agent has knowledge only (indirectly through the prices that were charged) about the utility functions of his
two neighbors, as they appeared the day before. The agents are monopolistic, i.e., agent n sets the price of his good,
and agent n− 1 then decide how much qn, he will buy at that price. This amount is then produced and sold—there is
no excess production. The goal of each agent is to maximize his utility, by adjusting pn and qn+1, while maintaining
a constant amount of money. Money has value only as liquidity.
The agents aim to achieve a situation where the expenditures are balanced by the income:
pnqn − pn+1qn+1 = 0 . (3)
This condition is important for our considerations. The agent envisions an ongoing process, which will be repeated
many times. In real life, he will eventually deal with very many agents. If he spends more money than he earns, he
will eventually run out of money, or reach a ceiling for debt, causing loss of utility thereafter. If he uses less than
he earns, he will be hoarding money, which gives no pleasure, but with a loss of utility. We assume that there is no
preference for consumption now rather than later. Perhaps he will over-spend for a while, but eventually he will try
to balance his budget.
Note that when the value of money is fixed at a global value, In = I, the agents optimize their utility by charging
a price
p = 2
1
3
· I−1 (4)
and selling an amount
q = 2−
2
3 (5)
at that price. This is the monopolistic equilibrium. In general, of course, with a different set of strategies there is
no reason that the dynamics should lead to the monopolistic equilibrium, or to any stationary state for that sake.
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Note that the resulting quantities, Eq. (5), are independent of the value of money, which thus represents a continuous
symmetry. There is nothing in the equations that fixes the value of money and the prices. Mathematically, the
continuous symmetry expresses the fact that the equations for the quantities are “homogeneous of order one.” The
number of equations is one less than the number of unknowns, leaving the value of money undetermined. This is the
continuous symmetry which eventually is broken by the dynamics.
Agent n tries to achieve his goal, of maximizing his utility and keeping constant his amount of money, by estimating
the amount of goods qn his neighbor will order at a given price, and the price pn+1 his other neighbor will charge
at the subsequent transaction. Knowing that his neighbors are rational beings like himself, he is able to deduce the
functional relationship between the price pn, he demands and the amount of goods qn, that will be ordered in response
to this. Furthermore, he is able to make a guess at the size of pn+1, based on the previous transaction with his right
neighbor. This enables him to decide what the perceived value of money should be, and hence how much he should
buy and what his price should be. This process is then continued indefinitely, at times τ = 1, 2, 3, . . .
This defines the game. The strategy we investigate contains the assumption made by each agent that the other
agents do not change their valuation of money I, between their two daily transactions, and hence they maximize their
utility accordingly.
The process is initiated by choosing some initial values for the Is. They could, e.g., be related to some former gold
standard. In fixing his price at his first transaction of day τ , agent n exploits the knowledge he has of his neighbors’
utility functions, i.e., he knows that the agent to the left will maximize his function with respect to qn,τ
∂un−1,τ
∂qn,τ
= 0 . (6)
His knowledge of the functional relationship, between the amount of goods qn−1,τ , ordered by agent n− 1 at time
τ and the price pn,τ , set by agent n, allows agent n to gauge the effect of his price policy. Lacking knowledge about
the value of In−1,τ , agent n instead uses the value from the last transaction In−1,τ−1. Substituting the expression for
qn,τ , found from solving Eq. (6), into Eq. (1) and maximizing with respect to pn and qn+1 we find (for details see [4])
In,τ+1 =
(
I4n−1,τ I
2
n,τ In+1,τ
) 1
7 (7)
which is a weighted geometric average of the value the two neighbors and agent n prescribed to their money the
previous day. Using this value of In, agent n can fix his price pn and decide which quantity qn+1, he should optimally
buy. This simple equation completely specifies the dynamics of our model. The entire strategy can be reduced to an
update scheme involving only the value of money—everything else follows from this. Thus, the value of money can
be considered the basic strategic variable!
Even though there is no utility in the possession of money, as explicitly expressed by Eq. (3), the strategies and
dynamics of the model nevertheless leads to a real utility, given by the third term in Eq. (1), being assigned to money.
The dynamics in this model is driven by the need of the agents to make estimates about future transactions. In a
sense, this models the real world where agents are forced to make plans about the future, based on knowledge about
the past—and, in practise, only a very limited part of the past.
In the steady state, where the homogeneity of the utility functions give In = In+1, we retrieve the monopolistic
equilibrium equations, Eqs. (4) and (5). Of course, this is somehow accidental. Other more or less rational strategies
will lead to different values of money.
A. Stability analysis
Taking the logarithm and introducing hn,τ = ln(In,τ ) yields the linear equation:
hn,τ+1 =
4
7
hn−1,τ +
2
7
hn,τ +
1
7
hn+1,τ . (8)
This describes a Markov process. Clearly, any h = constant solves this equation, in accordance with the fact that h
is a continuous symmetry. Thus, in order to get solutions, one must specify initial conditions. A simulation of 1000
agents with random initial values for the variable h (sampled from a uniform distribution on the interval [0,2]) is
shown below for illustration.
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FIG. 2. Price variation for single agent. The periodicity is an artifact of the boundary conditions of the lattice.
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FIG. 3. Variation of prices for all agents at two different times, τ = 3000 (solid line) and τ = 3200 (dotted line).
Now assume that hn,τ is a slowly varying function of (n, τ) and that we may think of it as the value of a differentiable
function h(x, t) in (x, t) = (nδx, τδt). Then, expanding to first order in δt and second order in δx, we find the diffusion
equation
∂h(x, t)
∂t
= D
∂2h(x, t)
∂x2
− v
∂h(x, t)
∂x
, (9)
where D = 514
(δx)2
δt
and v = 37
δx
δt
. The generator T , of infinitesimal time translations is defined by
∂h(x, t)
∂t
= Th(x, t) . (10)
Taking the lattice Fourier transformation, the eigenvalues of T are found to be λk = −k
2D−ikv, where the periodic
boundary condition yields k = 2pi
N
l; l = 0, 1, . . . , N −1. The damping time for each mode k, is given by tk = (k
2D)−1.
The only mode that is not dampened has k = 0, and is the soft “Goldstone mode” [5,6] associated with the broken
continuous symmetry with respect to a uniform shift of the logarithm of prices in the equilibrium:
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All prices can be changed by a common factor, but the amount of goods traded will remain the same; as already
noted by Marx [8] when discussing gold as the unit in which prices are expressed, i.e., the measure of value. The rest
of the modes are all damped, and hence the system eventually relaxes to the steady state.
Thus, despite the myopic behavior of the agents, the system manages to organize itself into the equilibrium. But
in contrast to equilibrium theory, we obtain the temporal relaxation rates towards the equilibrium, as well as specific
absolute values for the individual prices. The value of money is fixed by the history of the dynamical process, i.e., by
the initial condition combined with the actual strategies of the bounded rational agents.
Note that the steady states are all Nash equilibria: the agents can not change their behavior without loosing utility.
In the physics analogy, it requires energy for the atoms to shift away from the equililibrium, as long as their neighbors
remain fixed.
Thus, there is a continuous set of perfectly stable Nash equilibria. In contrast, the “search theoretical” approach [2,3]
yields a single Nash equilibrium, with a well defined value of money. The anchoring of the value is imposed by requiring
the pre-determined number of money traders, somewhat artificial and unrealistic, we believe, to spend all their money
at each transaction. If the condition for an agent changes he will change his value of money. If he, say invents an
easier way of production, he will lower his price, sell more, and buy more goods, the effect being deflation propagating
through the system, as described by the solution to Eq. (9) for a delta-function initial condition [9]. Likewise, if
production becomes more difficult for a single agent, or if he increases his lust for consumption, this will cause an
inflationary wave in the the whole system. For all agents, except the agent with changed production capability and his
neighbors, the changes in utility are transient effects. In the steady state all these agents will produce and consume
the same amount of goods as before the change, but at a different price level.
How much money is needed to run the economy? Since the agents merely seek to preserve a constant amount of
money, it does not really matter how much money they have, as long as they have sufficient liquidity to bridge the
interval between buying and selling. One could even imagine an economy with no real money at all, as long as the
seller would provide sufficient credit. If, at some point, it were decided by the government that dollar bills and coins
can not be used for payment, this would probably just amount to a nuisance. We would be forced to use credit and
debit cards and the like, but everything would work just as before. One could easily model this situation. The money
would merely be numbers on accounts.
III. CONCLUSION:
Here we considered a simple toy model with monopolistic agents. In general, economy deals with complicated
heterogeneous networks of agents, with complicated links to one another, representing the particular “games” they
play with one another. We submit that the general picture remains the same. At each trade, the agents evaluate the
value of money, by analyzing their particular local situation, and act accordingly. The prices charged by the agents
will be constrained by those of the interacting agents. The geometry and topology of realistic networks is much more
complicated, of course, but the continuous symmetry remains. The simple equation Eq. (8) would be replaced by a
much more complicated avereraging over many interacting neighbors. In any case, there is a continuous symmetry
related to a global change of prices, which is broken by the agents’ actions.
It would be interesting to study the formation and stability of markets where very many distributed players are
interested in the same goods, but not generally interacting directly with one another. Modifications of this network
model may also provide a toy laboratory for the study of the effects of the introduction of the key financial features of
credit and bankruptcy as well as the control problems posed by the governmental role in varying the money supply.
Here the underlying principle for assigning value to money was the dynamical breaking of the continuous symmetry,
leading to large fluctuations in the system when subjected to noise. For stock markets, it is often assumed that there
is a fundamental value to be discovered by the market. In reality, there could easily be so much uncertainty about
this value, that there would be no real restoring force for price fluctuations within a wide range. Effectively, we would
again have a continuous symmetry, and consequent large price fluctuations above and below what could be expected
from a theory based on rational expectations.
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